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This paper studies the synchronization of economic variables between South Africa and
the US. In addition it examines transmission channels through which supply and demand
shocks from the US a⁄ect economic activity in South Africa. We use a structural dynamic
factor model approach, instead of the well known structural vector autoregressive method,
as it accommodates a large panel of time series variables. The paper contains four ￿ndings.
First, using the full-sample period, US supply shocks are transmitted to South Africa through
business con￿dence and imports of goods and services; while US demand shocks are transmitted
via interest rates, stock prices, exports of goods and services, and real e⁄ective exchange rates.
Second, there is a decrease in integration over time as the common component of GDP drops
in the reduced sample. The impact of an increase in comovement of GDP is outweighed by
several factors resulting from the structural reforms initiated by the government after the end
of apartheid. Thirdly, in the latter period the South African economy is mainly a⁄ected by the
US supply shocks through a variety of channels. For this latter period, US supply shocks are
forcefully transmitted to South Africa via consumer and business con￿dence, stock prices and
real e⁄ective exchange rates. Finally, the idiosyncratic component still plays an important role
in the South African economy. Structural reforms are crucial to make the domestic economy
competitive internationally.
KEYWORDS;Dynamic factor models, international business cycles, sign restrictions.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: C3, E32, F00, E5
1 Introduction
This paper provides a thorough analysis of synchronization between the South African and US
economies. Furthermore, it emphasizes South African reaction to shocks originating from the US.
Besides the traditional channels ￿trade and ￿nancial linkages ￿underpinning the comovement of
economic variables between the two economies this paper studies other channels of transmission.
We use a structural dynamic factor model, which accommodates a large panel of South African
and the US variables. Sign restriction techniques allows the identi￿cation of two shocks from the
US, supply and demand, that explain more than 90 percent of variance of the US GDP over ￿ve
years.
￿Department of Economics, University of Johannesburg
1The paper contains four ￿ndings. First, using the full-sample period, US supply shocks are
transmitted to South Africa through business con￿dence and imports of goods and services; while
US demand shocks are transmitted via interest rates, stock prices, exports of goods and services,
and real e⁄ective exchange rates. Second, there is a decrease in integration over time as the common
component of GDP growth drops in the reduced sample. The impact of an increase in comovement
of GDP growth is outweighed by several factors resulting from the structural reforms initiated by
the government after the end of apartheid. Most importantly, the new monetary policy advocating
a more freely ￿ oating exchange-rate regime, trade openness, and liberalization of capital markets
have made the country more vulnerable to external shocks, increasing the weight of some channels
of transmission, such as interest rates and exchange rates. Thirdly, in the latter period the South
African economy is mainly a⁄ected by the US supply shocks through a variety of channels. For
this latter period, US supply shocks are forcefully transmitted to South Africa via consumer and
business con￿dence, stock prices and real e⁄ective exchange rates. Finally, a lower variance share
of the common component output growth implies that the idiosyncratic component still plays an
important role in the South African economy. Structural reforms are crucial to make the domestic
economy competitive internationally.
Section 2 gives a brief history of economic relations between South Africa and the US. A detailed
literature on synchronization and dynamic factor model is outlined in section 3. Section 4 provides
a summary of the empirical methods used in the investigating economic integration of South Africa
into the global market. It contains the theoretical ground of the Structural Dynamic Factor Model
by Forni et al. (2005) using the identi￿cation procedure of Peersman (2005) and Uhligh (2003).
Section 5 covers sources of data included in this study, their transformation, and the estimation
of model. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. It examines the degree of integration and the
transmission of US shocks to South Africa. Section 7 concludes and discusses policy implications.
2 Trade and Financial Linkages between South Africa and
the U.S.
The USA is South Africa￿ s second trading partner after Germany, accounting for 8.7 percent of
total trade (Exports + Imports) in 2006. South Africa is the largest trading partner of the US
in Sub-Saharan Africa. US exports to South Africa are the highest, while its imports from South
Africa are second after Nigeria. Like many African countries, the US￿ South Africa trade relation is
a classic example of North￿ South relationship. South Africa imports manufactured goods, including
aircraft and parts, industrial machinery and parts, electric machinery, motor vehicles and parts,
and telecommunication equipment, whilst its exports are mainly commodity-based. Precious stones
and metals constitute approximately 40 percent of total exports to the US. South Africa bene￿ted
from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) granted by the US through a reduction of tari⁄s
on approximately 4600 products. Furthermore, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
gives South Africa access to the world￿ s largest economy. In addition, the AGOA allows for the duty-
free access of 1800 products. Under the AGOA exports of manufactured products, such as motor
vehicles and parts, textiles and clothing, and agricultural products have increased considerably. For
nearly six years now, trade has been in South Africa￿ s favour, with a trade surplus increasing since
2000. Recently the country bene￿ted from high commodity prices; nevertheless this advantage was
tempered by the appreciation of the domestic currency and the high oil price.
US companies use South Africa as an entry port to the untapped African market. The country
2bene￿ts from this strategy because of its geographical location and its dominance in the region.
It is the region￿ s largest economy, with a sound ￿nancial system, adequate infrastructure, stable
political institutions, and vibrant economy. South Africa uses its leadership position in negotiating
free trade agreements between SADC and SACU, on the one hand, and with the United States, on
the other hand. SACU member states, through the AGOA, have access to the larger US market.
Trade plays a crucial role in attracting direct investments. FDI in￿ ows are somewhat dependent
on the degree of openness of the recipient country (Markusen, 2002). The higher the trade barriers,
the less FDI the country will receive and the less integrated it will be with the rest of the world.
Conversely, economic integration will promote market accessibility, which in turn will boost FDI
￿ ows, leading to more trade.
Many US ￿rms have taken advantage of preferential access to the US and EU markets by
increasing their investment in the South African textile and clothing industries. Generally, FDI
in￿ ows support US trade with South Africa. The US is the second source of FDI after the UK. In
contrast with many African countries, where in￿ ows from the US occurred in the natural resources
sector, FDI ￿ ows to South Africa are more diversi￿ed. Recently the net investment from the US has
come under pressure due to a large disinvestment from Telkom. Since 2000, however, investments in
the automotive industry have increased substantially. The net investment in the automotive sector
from the US is much larger than the investment from the EU. Also, as with trade, US companies
use South Africa as a ￿rst step into exploring the African market. The Lesotho and Swaziland
textile and clothing industries have gained a lot from FDI in￿ ows from the US.
The relaxation of capital controls has given South African companies the opportunity to diver-
sify their portfolios and take advantage of investment opportunities o⁄shore. Currently six South
African companies (AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Harmony Gold, Telkom, Sappi, and Sasol)
have listed on the New York stock exchange. Since the South African stock market is still very
small, dual listings contribute to the dependence of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on the New
York Stock Exchange. Cross-border diversi￿cation enhances the synchronization of equity returns,
which in turn emerges as a potential source of transmission of ￿nancial shocks. Another factor
explaining comovement of equity prices is the presence of a considerable number of multinational
companies in South Africa, which are bene￿ting from its sound ￿nancial system. Most these com-
panies are listed in both countries. Finally, ￿nancial market linkages have facilitated the possibility
of cross-border arbitrage through derivatives or hedging. Hence, South African stock prices seem
to react more to global factors than to idiosyncratic factors.
Furthermore, the gradual removal of capital controls has encouraged in￿ ows of short-term capital
in the country. The favourable external environment accompanied by the rise in commodity prices
and a vibrant domestic expenditure have boosted portfolio in￿ ows recently. This rise in in￿ ows has
created a capital account surplus. Importantly, the capital account surplus of 2006 is primarily due
to both portfolio and direct investment ￿ ows. It has played a crucial role in o⁄setting the current
account de￿cit. But short-term in￿ ows surpass direct investment. This situation makes the South
African economy vulnerable to external shocks.
The US constitutes approximately 30 percent of global demand. It is the world￿ s largest econ-
omy; therefore it in￿ uences the global economy to a large extent. A buoyant American economy has
positive e⁄ects in most parts of the world. For example, the productivity shocks of the 1990s in￿ u-
enced the South African economy positively. Ever since, the country has enjoyed a long and lasting
expansionary period. The burst of technological bubble was also felt in South Africa. Conversely,
a downswing in the American economy slows the domestic activity too. Global current-account
imbalances present a major concern to the local economy and should be monitored closely. So far,
3higher commodity prices and strong economic growth from emerging markets have dampened the
negative e⁄ects of these imbalances.
Consumer con￿dence and business con￿dence are non-negligible channels through which shocks
are transmitted across countries. Anderton, di Mauro and Moneta (2004) and IMF (2001) ￿nd
strong comovements in con￿dence indices across major advanced economies and evidence of con-
￿dence spillovers. Sentiments of economic agents about the current and the future state of the
economy in one country can a⁄ect opinions of agents in another country. Consumer con￿dence
tends to in￿ uence consumption, while business con￿dence impacts investment. For example, the
events of 11 September 2001 in the US a⁄ected business con￿dence in America, and South African
business sentiment was then also a⁄ected. The overall results were a decrease in economic activity
in the US ￿rst, followed by a decline in economic activity in South Africa. Similarly, productiv-
ity shocks in the US brought about positive sentiments of agents about the US economy. These
sentiments were also felt in South Africa.
3 Literature Review
There is an ongoing debate involving the public, academics and policymakers about economic inte-
gration or the e⁄ect of globalization on developed and developing economies. There is a consensus in
the literature that globalization has largely positive e⁄ects on economies. However, the theoretical
point of view is still unclear about the e⁄ect of globalization on economies.
Globalization fosters comovement of macroeconomic variables across countries through trade
integration and ￿nancial market integration (IMF, 2001 and Imbs, 2004). Trade integration is a
result of the gradual removal of barriers among countries to allow free circulation of goods and
services. An increase in exports in one country can trigger a rise in the demand for imports and
boost the economic activity of the recipient country (Canova and Dellas, 1993 and IMF, 2001).
Such spillover e⁄ects result in an increase in trade linkages, which in turn leads to high correlation
of business cycles across countries.
The integration of ￿nancial markets has also contributed to the synchronization of business
cycles through the opening of countries￿capital accounts. Financial integration facilitates diver-
si￿cation of risks by the agents through investment across borders. Financial prices have become
more synchronized through arbitrage, i.e. volatility in one market spreads easily to other markets.
Brooks, Forbes, and Mody (2003) summarize some important stylized facts on comovement between
the G-7 countries and emerging-market economies. This is based on the outcomes of a conference
where research focused on the strength, nature and sources of comovement in ￿nancial markets.
The stylized facts are as follows: ￿rstly, ￿nancial comovements tend to be substantially larger than
comovements in the real economy. Secondly, ￿nancial comovement has increased for ￿nancial mar-
kets in developed as well as in emerging-market economies. Lastly, no clear evidence exists on the
comovement in the real economy. Brooks et al. (2003) conclude that, in contrast with clear and
relatively consistent evidence on ￿nancial comovement, evidence on real comovement is ￿blurred
and controversial￿ . For example, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 spread rapidly to most developing
countries because of synchronization of their ￿nancial markets. Furthermore, the global slowdown
of 2000-2001 was caused by the crash of the technology stock market in the US.
On the empirical front, most ￿ndings show increasing synchronization of economic variables
across countries. Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2005) use the Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model to
study the changes in the nature of G-7 business cycles over time. They extract common components
in output, consumption, and investment. They ￿nd that the degree of synchronization of business
4cycles of major macroeconomic aggregates across G-7 countries has increased during this period.
On the nature of shocks that drive the comovement, they ￿nd that the oil-price shocks are behind
synchronization of cycles during the ￿common shocks￿period.
Nadal-De Simone (2002) used a concordance index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) and
the dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson (1991) to analyze synchronization of output cycles
between EU countries and the US. Results support the evidence of a global component as well
as a regional component that explains comovement between European economies themselves and
with the US. The author found that idiosyncratic components matter for France. In the same
vein, Monfort et al. (2004), Kose et al. (2003a), Malek Mansour (2003), Yang (2003), Lumsdaine
and Prasad (2003), Bordo and Helbling (2004), and Canova et al. (2007) support the view that
￿ uctuations of most macroeconomic variables across developed countries are mainly driven by a
global factor. The existence of a common business cycle or world cycle is evidence of linkages
of macroeconomic variables across countries: in other words, it is substantial proof of economic
integration among high-income economies.
On the other hand, Kose and Yi (2006), Kose et al. (2003b), Stock and Watson (2003), and
Heitz et al. (2004) ￿nd that, despite large increases in trade and openness, G-7 business cycles have
become less synchronized. The reason is that trade ￿ ows could lead to increased specialization of
production resulting in changes in the nature of business cycles. In this case trade ties are closely
related to a rise in inter-industry specialization across nations, and then industry-speci￿c shocks
are the main driving forces of business cycles. Therefore the synchronization of business cycle
might decrease. Similarly, international ￿nancial linkages could also stimulate production through
the reallocation of capital in a manner consistent with countries￿comparative advantage in the
production of di⁄erent goods (Imbs, 2004). Financial integration tends to result in specialization
of economies, which in turn reduces business cycle synchronization.
However, there still is a gap in the literature on economic integration of developing countries.
Lee, Park and Shin (2004) ￿nd that synchronization of business cycles in East Asia is comparable
to Europe. They argue that regional integration is mainly in￿ uenced by trade integration rather
than ￿nancial integration. They observe that ￿nancial liberalization in East Asia has led to global
integration rather than regional integration. Therefore, they suggest that the successful formation
of a currency union will foster the process of integration. However, Kim, Kim, and Wang (2005)
show that besides trade, ￿nancial integration in Asia has increased the synchronization of business
cycles. Also, business cycles of ￿ve of Asian crisis countries are not only highly synchronized among
themselves, but follow the Japanese cycle. Contrary to Lee et al. (2004), Kim et al. (2005) ￿nd
that rapid ￿nancial market liberalization of 1990s has contributed substantially to an increase in
comovement of business cycles across countries in the region. Furthermore, the 1997 Asian crisis has
induced policymakers to come up with some initiatives encouraging cooperation and synchronization
of policies among the ASEAN+31 countries (Sakakibara and Yamakawa, 2003).
Unlike the East Asian region, the Latin American region is not economically integrated (Ma-
chinea and Rozenwurcel, 2006). These countries have repeatedly experienced long periods of po-
litical instability and economic crises. Although policymakers have taken deliberate initiatives to
induce cooperation in the region, intra-regional trade is almost entirely lacking. An attempt to in-
crease trade in the region failed after the 1998 crisis. Canova (2005) ￿nds a signi￿cant comovement
of output and in￿ ation in Latin America driven by US monetary disturbances. Similarly, ￿nancial
1ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) + 3 comprises Brune Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and the following three countries, China, Japan,
and Republic of Korea.
5integration in Latin America is still in its infancy, the reason being that there is an insigni￿cant
￿ ow of capital across countries. On the one hand, most of the regional multinational companies are
either listed in the US or in the EU; on the other hand, FDI ￿ ows in from abroad (IADB, 2002). As
Latin American countries share the same external vulnerability, negative international shocks tend
to have the same impact across the region. Hence, international ￿nancial crises spread easily in the
region without a priori ￿nancial integration (Machinea and Rozenwurcel, 2005). Aiol￿, Catªo, and
Timmermann (2006) also ￿nd that trade and ￿nancial linkages in the region have remained small.
However, they identify the existence of a sizeable regional component in Latin American business
cycles. Instead of a regional factor, like Canaova (2005), they ￿nd that global factors are the main
driving forces of common business cycle components in the region.
Africa seems to be a region that is under-researched in terms of regional and global integration.
Like Latin America, trade and ￿nancial integration in Africa is virtually non-existent. Recently,
there has been an increase in trade among CEFA-zone countries, SACU countries, and COMESA
members.2 Despite the theoretical linkages between Sub-Saharan African countries and EMU,
Nyembwe and Kholodilin (2005) ￿nd that EMU has had only a limited impact on a few African
countries. But they observe a lagged impact of European monetary policies on Sub-Saharan African
countries. The impact becomes somewhat stronger with CFA-zone countries, as they peg their
domestic currencies to the Euro. Kose and Riezman (2001) investigated the link between external
shocks and the high volatility of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations in Africa. They argue that trade rather
than ￿nancial shocks plays a more important role. Trade shocks account for approximately half
of the volatility of macroeconomic variables. Like Latin American countries, African countries are
heterogeneous, which makes economic integration di¢ cult to achieve (Jenkins and Thomas, 1998).
Furthermore, countries import and export much the same products ￿manufactured products and
natural resources, respectively. There is a consensus among academics (Mason and Patillo, 2005,
and Arora and Vamvakidis, 2005) that the overlapping of memberships between di⁄erent regional
organizations hinders regional integration considerably. These academics suggest a sequencing of
integration, starting with regional organizations that are more or less integrated, such as the SACU,
the CFA zone, and COMESA.
4 Methodology
The methodology used in this paper comprises two main steps: ￿rst, an estimation of the common
components of a large panel of data; and, second, the identi￿cation of a limited number of structural
shocks that explain the common components of the variables of interest. In brief, the estimation
procedure requires the following:
￿ Use of a large panel of data ful￿lling the condition that the number of time series is ￿much
larger￿than the number of observations (in a sense to be made clear below);
￿ Decomposition of each time series into two unobserved parts: a common component, driven
by shocks common to all series, and an idiosyncratic component;
2SACU ￿the South African Customs Union ￿comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.
COMESA ￿ the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ￿ includes Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC,
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Rwanda, Swaziland,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The EAC comprises Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
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represent the reduced form of the model;
￿ Estimation of the VAR to obtain the coe¢ cients matrix and the reduced-form residuals.
￿ Orthogonalization of these residuals to obtain the impulse-response functions and forecast
error variances;
￿ Assuming that the orthogonalized residuals are linearly correlated to a vector of ￿fundamen-
tals￿driving the variable of interest via a matrix such that the ￿rst shock explains as much
as possible of the forecast error variance of the common components; the second one explains
as much as possible of the remaining variance, and so on;
￿ Computation of the impulse-response functions and the variance decomposition of the ￿rst
few principal component shocks (e.g., the ￿rst two, neglect others);
￿ Recovery of the structural shocks that explain the principal component shocks by rotating a
matrix such that orthogonal structural shocks produce impulse responses satisfying a set of
economically meaningful (sign) restrictions; and
￿ Construction of con￿dence intervals for the impulse responses using bootstrapping so as to
account for biases in the VAR coe¢ cients and the agnostic nature of the model.
The estimation procedure is explained in detail below. The reader not interested in technical
details can skip the remainder of this section.
4.1 The Model
This paper uses a large dimensional approximate dynamic factor model. This paper uses the
static factor model of Stock and Watson (1998 and 2002). This model is closely related to the
traditional factor models of Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke (1977), except that it admits the
possibility of serial correlation and weak cross-sectional correlation of idiosyncratic components, as
in Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983). Similar models have recently been
used by Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala (2002), Forni and others (2005), and Eickmeier (2007).
The intuition behind the approximate dynamic factor model analysis is simple. A vector of time
series Yt = (y1t;y2t;:::;yNt) can be represented as the sum of two latent components, a common
component Xt = (x1t;x2t; :::;xNt)
0and an idiosyncratic component ￿t = ("lt;"2t;:::;"Nt)
0 :
Yt = Xt + ￿t (1)
Yt = CFt + ￿
where Ft = (flt;f2t;:::;frt)




0 is a Nxr
matrix of factor loadings, with r << N. The common component Xt, which is a linear combination
of common factors, is driven by a limited number of common shocks, which are the same for all
variables. Nevertheless, the e⁄ects of the common shocks di⁄er from one variable to another due
to di⁄erent factor loadings. In this framework and in contrast to standard common component
analysis, the idiosyncratic component is driven by idiosyncratic shocks, which are speci￿c to each
variable. The static factor model used here di⁄ers from the dynamic factor model in that it treats
7lagged or dynamic factors Ft as additional static factors. Thus, common factors include both lagged
and contemporaneous factors.
Identi￿cation of the common components requires the number of series to be much larger than
the number of observations. Stock and Watson demonstrate that by using the law of large number
(as T;N ￿! 1), the idiosyncratic component, which is weakly correlated by construction, vanishes;
and therefore, the common component can be easily estimated in a consistent manner by using
standard principal component analysis. The ￿rst r eigenvalues and eigenvectors are calculated
from the variance-covariance matrix cov(Yt):
Xt = V V 0Yt (2)
and since the factor loadings C = V , Equation (1) becomes,
Ft = V 0Yt (3)
From (1), the idiosyncratic component is
￿t = Yt ￿ Xt (4)
From all the more or less formal criteria to determine the number of static factors r, Bai and Ng
(2002) information criteria were selected. As in Forni and others (2005), Ft was approximated by
an autoregressive representation of order one3 :
Ft = BFt￿1 + ut (5)
where ￿ is a r xr matrix and ut a r x t vector of residuals. Equation (5) is the reduced form model
of (1). For details on the economic conditions for identi￿cation, see Appendix A.
5 Data and Estimation Technique
5.1 Data Discussion
This paper uses large panel data containing 277 quarterly series (N = 277) of the United States,
aggregate series of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the United Kingdom, and South Africa;
observed from 1985Q1 to 2003Q4 (T = 75). In addition, a set of global variables such as crude
oil prices and commodity industrial inputs price index is included. The dataset contains real and
nominal variables: for example, GDP, consumption, investment and prices; as well as the external
side of each country. Furthermore, the panel also comprises portfolio ￿ ows and FDI ￿ ows, ￿nancial
variables and con￿dence indices. Most of series are taken from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund and the OECD statistics.
To evaluate the dynamics of integration, the study is conducted on a shorter sample period
including the same quarterly series. This new sample contains observations for the period 1995Q1-
2003Q4. This choice coincides with the new era in South African economy symbolized by the
end of apartheid. The comparison of these two periods will indicate as to whether the degree of
synchronization has increased over time.
3VAR(1) provides a dynamic representation, which is parsimonious and quite general when its order is at most
equal to the number of factors (for more details, see Gianonne et al., 2002, and Stock and Watson, 2005).
8Outliers are removed and all series are transformed into natural logarithms, except those in
percentages and with negative values. All series are seasonally adjusted and covariance stationary.
The more powerful DFGLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996), instead of the most
popular ADF test, is used to assess the degree of integration of all series. All nonstationary series
are made stationary through di⁄erencing and/or deterministic detrending. The Schwarz information
criterion is used in the selecting the appropriate lag length in such a way that no serial correction
is left in the stochastic error term. Where there were doubts about the presence of unit root, the
KPSS test proposed by Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992), with the null hypothesis
of stationarity, was applied. All series are standardized to have a mean of zero and a constant
variance. The Appendix B to this paper contains details about the statistical treatment of all data.
5.2 Estimation
As discussed earlier in this section 4, the ￿rst step of dynamic factor modeling is the determination
of the number of factors to include. In the absence of a formal statistical procedure to determine
the number of factors, there are two methods that are mostly used: the Bai and Ng (2002) approach
and the static principal component method. Following Bai and Ng (2002), there is no consensus
as to the choice of the number of factors to include. PCp1 suggests six factors, while PCp2, and
PCp3 propose ￿ve and eight factors, respectively. Furthermore, according to the ICp1 and ICp2
criteria, three factors are optimal, while ICp3 proposes ￿ve factors. Importantly, Bai and Ng (2002)
suggest that ICp1 and ICp2 are more robust than PCp1 and PCp2: We propose four factors based
on static principal component analysis. Table 1 reports cumulated variance share by 10 principal
components. Using the principal component approach, the ￿rst four principal components explain
31 percent of the total variance. The variance explained by the additional principal component
is less than ￿ve percent benchmark. These results di⁄er somewhat from Kabundi and Nadal De
Simone (2007), and Eickmeier (2007), who suggest ￿ve and eight common factors, respectively, for
the US market. One possible explanation of such di⁄erence is our restricted sample size.
Following the identi￿cation procedure of Uhlig (2003) on the common component of US GDP,
a reduced number of structural shocks that maximizes the explanation of its forecast error variance
over 20 periods is computed. It results in the identi￿cation of only two structural shocks which
explain 96 percent of the forecast error variance of the common component of US GDP. In the
reduced sample, the percentage remains the same, it drops to 89.
To avoid commonly used zero restrictions, which are sometimes very restrictive, the study uses
sign restrictions proposed by Peersman (2005). This method imposes sign restrictions on impulse-
response functions based on a typical aggregate-demand, aggregate-supply diagram. To account for
uncertainty in the factor estimation, a bootstrap technique based on Kilian (1998) is implemented,
which is necessary in constructing con￿dence bands. The paper uses a 90 percent con￿dence interval.
However, in most cases con￿dence intervals seem wider. The draws recover a set of shocks that
satisfy the restrictions. In total the bootstrap was made up of 500 shocks.4
4510 draws were needed.
96 Empirical Results
6.1 US Shocks
A bivariate analysis as depicted in Figure 1 shows the comovement of GDP growth rates of South
Africa and the US, with the US leading. The two countries experienced a downturn in the beginning
of 1990s. The South African recession was deeper and long-lived. The only di⁄erence in the cycle
occurs in 1997. This was caused by the Asian crisis, which did not a⁄ect most of the advanced
economies. In addition, it shows a relative strong comovement with the South African growth rate
and the common component. However, the bivariate analysis does not provide a complete picture
of the synchronization of cycles. It is silent as to whether the South African cycle is in￿ uenced
by the US cycle. It is essential to use a more advanced technique that can simultaneously assess
di⁄erent channels of transmission underpinning synchronization of cycles between South Africa and
the US.
A Structural VAR approach is not appropriate in this instance as it does not incorporate a large
panel of time series due to the degree-of-freedom constraint. Instead, the paper uses a structural
dynamic factor model, which is quite similar to the above approach, with the main di⁄erence that
the latter accommodates large a cross-section of time series. As with the SVAR, the structural
dynamic factor model uses impulse-response functions and variance decomposition to study the
impact of shocks across countries. Tables 2 and 3 show the variance decomposition and the forecast
error variance of the common components of US and South African variables explained by the two
identi￿ed US shocks. On the other hand, Figure 2 depicts the impulse-response functions of the
U.S. shocks and their impact on US and South African variables.
Following Uhlig (2003), the model extracts the two identi￿ed shocks that explain as much as
possible of forecast error variance of the common component of US GDP. The US GDP represents
economic activity in the United States. Kabundi and Nadal De Simone (2007), Eickmeier (2007),
and Uhlig (2003) also ￿nd that two shocks explain an important portion of variation in the US
GDP. Table 2a indicates that the two shocks explain 96 percent of forecast error variance of the
common component of US GDP for both the full sample period, and it drops to 89 percent for
the reduced sample. The identi￿ed supply shocks account for 47 percent of the error variance of
the common component of the US GDP over ￿ve years, while the demand shocks account for 49
percent. The variance share of US GDP explained by the common component is 50 percent for
the full-sample period; it increases to 71 percent for the reduced-sample period.5 In addition, the
percentage explained by supply shocks increases to 54 percent, and demand shocks explain only 35
percent of the error variance. From Table 2a it is evident that private investment, employment,
capacity utilization, short-term interest rates, and exports score higher variance, which is explained
by the common component for the full-sample period. Of these, the supply shocks seem to a⁄ect
personal consumption expenditure and consumer con￿dence more. This is in line with what is
discussed above, i.e. consumer con￿dence tends to a⁄ect primarily consumer behaviour. Demand
shocks have strong e⁄ects on private investment, capacity utilization, short- and long-term interest
rates, M1 money supply, stock prices, wages, exports, imports, real e⁄ective exchange rates, and
inward FDI.
The picture is somewhat di⁄erent for the period 1995-2003. Table 3a shows that most variables
have higher variance shares of the common components. This time, private investment, personal
consumption expenditure, government disbursements, stock prices, and out￿ ow of FDI react more
5See Table 3a
10to supply shocks. These can be seen as productivity shocks that a⁄ected the American economy
in the 1990s. In turn, demand shocks in￿ uence only consumer con￿dence, business con￿dence, and
the real e⁄ective exchange rates.
From Figure 2 it is clear that supply shocks are productivity-driven, i.e. positive supply shocks
from the US increase productivity permanently. There is also a permanent rise in output, in-
vestment, personal consumption expenditure; capacity utilization decreases and employment rises
slowly. Consumer con￿dence reacts positively, while the impact on business con￿dence is some-
what opposite to expectations. Share prices also react favourably. The e⁄ect on prices is negative,
pushing monetary authorities to decrease interest rates initially and increase them later in reaction
to wage increases.6 The rise in the money supply is short-lived. The e⁄ect on imports is stronger
than on exports, resulting in current account de￿cit. Positive supply shocks attract more FDI into
the country, while the e⁄ects on terms of trade and real e⁄ective exchange rates seem mild.
E⁄ects of demand shocks on output, investment, personal consumption expenditure, productiv-
ity, and consumer con￿dence are short-lived. Conversely, they have a long-term positive impact on
capacity utilization, prices, wages and share prices. Monetary authority increases short-term inter-
est rates as a reaction to increases in prices and wages. Exports and imports are on the rise, but
imports increase more than exports, leading to a current account de￿cit. Finally, demand shocks
encourage in￿ ows and out￿ ows of foreign investments.
6.2 Transmission of US Shocks to South Africa
This section studies South African reaction to US shocks. Table 2b depicts the variance share by the
common component and forecast error variance explained by US supply and demand shocks. The
full-sample analysis displays a variance share of common component of the South African economic
growth of 54 percent; which suggests a close synchronization of the two economic cycles. The
transmission channels that matter are consumer and business con￿dence, consumer prices, short-
and long-term interest rates, and real e⁄ective exchange rates, with relatively high variance share
of common components. It is evident that except for consumer and business con￿dence, ￿nancial
channels seem more important than trade channels.
US supply shocks are transmitted more forcefully to South African GDP than US demand
shocks. US supply shocks explain 29 percent of the error variance of South African GDP common
components while US demand shocks explain 2 percent. Only imports of goods and services, and
business con￿dence matter for transmission of supply shocks. However, almost all channels matter
for the transmission of demand shocks. Demand shocks explain 56 percent and 85 percent of error
variance of South African short- and long-term interest rates, respectively; while supply shocks
explain 33 percent and 6 percent. The percentage of error variance explained by stock prices is 21
percent for demand shocks as against 0 percent for supply shocks. While demand shocks explain
only 14 percent of error variance of imports, they explain 77 percent of error variance of exports, in
contrast to 3 percent for supply shocks. Lastly, the real e⁄ective exchange rate serves as a demand
than a supply channel, scoring the error variance of 80 percent, as against 3 percent for supply
shocks.
Alongside the analysis of variance decomposition, impulse-response functions in Figure 2 provide
a picture of transmission channels of US shocks to South Africa. US supply shocks are transmitted
6Surprisingly, the short- and long-term interest rates display unusual behavior after a supply shock; they stay
high after a gradual increase and do not come back to the baseline. Several attempts to achieve a response in line
with theoretical models were not successful.
11gradually but permanently to the South African economic growth rate, output, investment, personal
consumption expenditure, and government expenditure. Impulse-response functions have negative
e⁄ects on consumer and business con￿dence; but these e⁄ects are statistically insigni￿cant. CPI
and ULC decrease at the moment of the shock, putting pressure on monetary authorities to reduce
short-term interest rates. Furthermore, US supply shocks are favourable to South African imports
of goods and services. The e⁄ects on exports, terms of trade, real e⁄ective exchange rates, and the
current accounts are statistically insigni￿cant.
Against the above, US demand shocks have immediate but short-lived impacts on economic
growth rate, output, investment, personal consumption expenditure, and government expenditure.
Consumer and business con￿dence react positively. There is a gradual increase in CPI and M1
money supply, leading to a slow increase in short-term interest rates. Share prices increase im-
mediately after the shock and remain high. Similarly, imports increase on impact, while exports
increase steadily. Consequently, the terms of trade are favourable, the current account worsens,
and the rand depreciates.
6.3 Evolution of Integration
Output and economic growth rates show a drop in their variance share of their common components,
suggesting at ￿rst glance a decrease in synchronization of cycles between South Africa and the
US.7 These results are consistent with du Plessis (2006) who didn￿ t a signi￿cant comovement with
the US cycle. The drop in integration is justi￿ed by the fact that the end of apartheid brought
some challenges which required political and economic reforms. The ￿rst democratic government
embarked in pro-poor reforms based on redistribution of resources to correct the wrong doing of the
past, but these reforms were less popular to most businesses. The reason was that the reconstruction
and development policy (RDP) was demand-led with high government expenditure, which in turn
put high pressure on prices, resulting in high in￿ ation. Thus, the ￿rst round of reforms did little to
stimulate the economy. The second democratic government initiated further economic reforms that
were this time market friendly, focusing on stimulating growth through trade and ￿nancial openness,
￿scal discipline and sound monetary policy. During this period the country experienced its ￿rst ever
long expansionary period. Yet, these reforms were still not enough to achieve an economic growth
necessary to solve the numerous problems the country is facing. Also the economic performance is
still lagging behind other emerging economies of Latin America or Asia. For the last eight years
the average GDP growth rate was 3.7 percent. Hence, the decrease in synchronization indicates
a catching-up process of the South African economy due to structural reforms ￿such as a new
monetary regime, openness of trade and capital markets, increase in political stability and reduced
uncertainty, all of which the country initiated after the end of apartheid. These factors outweigh
the increase in comovement of South Africa GDP with the US.
For this latter period, consumer con￿dence and business con￿dence play important as channels
of transmission of shocks. Sentiments of economic agents about the current and the future state of
the economy in US a⁄ect opinions of agents in South Africa. Consumer con￿dence tends to in￿ uence
consumption, while business con￿dence impacts investment. Furthermore, the new monetary regime
advocating a freely ￿ oating exchange rate associated with a gradual liberalization of capital markets,
in￿ uences interest rates and exchange rates, and stock prices more than in the past, making the
South African capital market more integrated in the world ￿nancial market. On the other hand,
7See variance shares of common component in Table 3b.
12the role played by trade openness seems small, even though the variance shares of imports and
exports show a small increase.
US supply shocks are forcefully transmitted to South Africa via consumer and business con￿-
dence ￿with error variance shares of 36 percent and 57 percent, respectively. Moreover, stock prices
and real e⁄ective exchange rates also have higher error variance of supply shocks ￿28 percent and
16 percent ￿compared to the error variance of demand shocks of 6 percent and 0 percent, respec-
tively. On the other hand, demand shocks are transmitted through exports and imports of goods
and services.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the synchronization of economic variables between South Africa and the US. In
addition it examines transmission channels through which supply and demand shocks from the US
a⁄ect economic activity in South Africa. First, the bivariate analysis shows evidence of synchro-
nization of South African economic growth with that of the US. Second, the structural dynamic
factor model applied to a large panel of economic variables extracts the common components of
all series. From this analysis, it emerges that the South African growth rate and its common
component comove, suggesting a synchronization of output growth. The variance share of common
component obtained from the multivariate analysis shows variation in the domestic growth, and this
is explained somewhat by the common component. Furthermore, the variance shares of the com-
mon components reveal consumer and business con￿dence, consumer prices, short- and long-term
interest rates, and real e⁄ective exchange rate are the main channels of transmission of shocks.
This study also ￿nds, using the full-sample period that US supply shocks are transmitted to
South Africa through business con￿dence and imports of goods and services, while U.S. demand
shocks are transmitted via interest rates, stock prices, exports of goods and services, and real
e⁄ective exchange rates. This paper also indicates a decrease in integration over time as the common
component of GDP drops in the reduced sample. The reduced-sample analysis reveals that channels
of transmission change, due to the structural reforms the country undertook after apartheid was
eliminated. Most importantly, the new monetary policy, advocating a more ￿ exible exchange rate
regime, trade openness, and liberalization of capital markets, has made the country more vulnerable
to external shocks, increasing the weight of some channels of transmission, such as interest rates and
exchange rates. Hence, for this latter period, the South African capital market is more integrated
in the world ￿nancial market. On the contrary, trade liberalization has not yet played a signi￿cant
part in the integration process.
Given these ￿ndings, and because of the vulnerability of the economy to shocks from the US,
South African policymakers should closely monitor developments in the US economy. Failure to
do this would make the domestic policy ine⁄ective. However, the idiosyncratic component still
plays an important role in the South African economy. Structural reforms are crucial to make the
domestic economy competitive internationally.
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Table 1: Determining r  
                       
k PCp1  PCp2 PCp3  ICp1 ICp2  ICp3  Cumulated Variance Share 
1 0.9090 0.9110 0.9033  -0.0644  -0.0603  -0.0759  0.11 
2 0.8565 0.8605 0.8452  -0.0993  -0.0911  -0.1223  0.20 
3 0.8346 0.8406 0.8176  -0.1035
* -0.0913
* -0.1381 0.26 
4 0.8198 0.8277 0.7971  -0.1032  -0.0870  -0.1493  0.31 
5 0.8069 0.8169




  0.7721 -0.0919  -0.0676 -0.1611  0.39 
7 0.8090 0.8229 0.7694  -0.0757  -0.0472  -0.1563  0.42 
8 0.8136 0.8296 0.7684
* -0.0591 -0.0266  -0.1513  0.45 
9 0.8211 0.8391 0.7702  -0.0399  -0.0034  -0.1437  0.48 
10 0.8299  0.8498 0.7733  -0.0208  0.0198  -0.1361  0.50 
Note: 
*denotes the minimum based on Bai and Ng (2002) criteria 
 
 
Table 2a. Forecast Error Variance of the Common Component of USA Variables Explained by the USA Supply and the Demand 
Shock, 1985-2003 1/ 
              
  Confidence Intervals  Confidence Intervals 
 
Variance 




Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Demand 
Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
GDP 0.50  0.47  0.06  0.85  0.49  0.10  0.78 
Private investment  0.73  0.19  0.01  0.75  0.60  0.07  0.81 
Personal consumption expenditure 0.25  0.65  0.07  0.90  0.04  0.03  0.45 
Employment 0.59  0.34  0.01  0.76  0.43  0.11  0.86 
Productivity 0.17  0.28  0.02  0.85  0.02  0.01  0.49 
Capacity Utilization  0.79  0.02 0.00  0.26 0.95 0.43  0.96 
Government current disbursements  0.14  0.15  0.00  0.76  0.11  0.01  0.39 
Government current receipts  0.20 0.07 0.01  0.57 0.86  0.36 0.96 
Consumer confidence  0.09  0.50  0.04  0.88  0.08  0.03  0.35 
Business confidence  0.11  0.10  0.03  0.73  0.14  0.01  0.51 
Consumer prices  0.43  0.22  0.02  0.81  0.36  0.01  0.70 
Short-term interest rates  0.59  0.09  0.01  0.56  0.84  0.33  0.96 
Long-term interest rates  0.24  0.06  0.01  0.44  0.75  0.24  0.95 
M1 0.51  0.01  0.02  0.47  0.55  0.04  0.76 
Stock prices  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.82  0.11  0.86 
Wages 0.42  0.05  0.01  0.53  0.93  0.36  0.96 
Exports total  0.51  0.02  0.00  0.49  0.71  0.19  0.95 
Imports total  0.41  0.26  0.04  0.77  0.64  0.10  0.85 
Terms of trade  0.09  0.06  0.01  0.69  0.05  0.02  0.66 
Real effective exchange  0.38  0.02  0.00  0.66  0.43  0.00  0.47 
Current account balance  0.16  0.34  0.02  0.86  0.14  0.03  0.46 
FDI out  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.51  0.12  0.01  0.65 
FDI in  0.04  0.08  0.02  0.63  0.85  0.13  0.89 





   
Table 2b. Forecast Error Variance of the Common Component of South Africa Variables Explained by the USA Supply and the 
Demand Shock, 1985-2003 1/ 
            
  Confidence Intervals  Confidence Intervals 
 
Variance 




Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Demand 
Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
GDP  0.17  0.29 0.02  0.69  0.02 0.01  0.42 
Gross Fixed Investment  0.12  0.05  0.01  0.50  0.28  0.02  0.66 
Personal consumption expenditure  0.02  0.16 0.01  0.63  0.49 0.08  0.86 
Government consumption expenditure  0.01  0.21 0.03  0.83  0.50 0.02  0.54 
Consumer  confidence  0.38  0.02 0.02  0.52  0.01 0.01  0.56 
Business  confidence  0.42  0.13 0.02  0.54  0.04 0.01  0.52 
Consumer  prices  0.60  0.08 0.00  0.65  0.01 0.00  0.34 
Short-term interest rates  0.49  0.33  0.03  0.80  0.56  0.01  0.53 
Long-term  interest  rates  0.38  0.06 0.01  0.50  0.85 0.10  0.84 
M1  0.04  0.24 0.01  0.61  0.39 0.09  0.84 
Stock  prices  0.07  0.00 0.00  0.56  0.21 0.02  0.63 
Unit Labour Cost  0.24  0.14  0.00  0.72  0.01  0.00  0.34 
Exports  total  0.01  0.03 0.01  0.45  0.77 0.09  0.85 
Imports  total  0.01  0.82 0.08  0.91  0.14 0.05  0.62 
Terms of trade  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.56  0.14  0.02  0.65 
Real effective exchange  0.62  0.03  0.00  0.37  0.80  0.08  0.80 
Current account balance  0.13  0.02  0.00  0.33  0.89  0.18  0.87 
Economic  growth  0.54  0.12 0.01  0.55  0.06 0.01  0.54 
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  Confidence Intervals  Confidence Intervals 
 
Variance 




Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Demand 
Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
GDP 0.71  0.54  0.01  0.76  0.35  0.11  0.96 
Private investment  0.70  0.63  0.01  0.79  0.11  0.02  0.90 
Personal consumption expenditure 0.24  0.68  0.01  0.81  0.05  0.03  0.88 
Employment 0.57  0.30  0.02  0.58  0.02  0.03  0.78 
Productivity 0.61  0.36  0.02  0.71  0.48  0.04  0.74 
Capacity Utilization  0.94  0.13 0.00  0.71 0.02 0.00  0.78 
Government current disbursements  0.24  0.70  0.01  0.87  0.02  0.01  0.83 
Government current receipts  0.25 0.03  0.01  0.61 0.01  0.01  0.76 
Consumer confidence  0.16  0.19  0.01  0.45  0.70  0.16  0.93 
Business confidence  0.19  0.02  0.01  0.67  0.73  0.04  0.81 
Consumer prices  0.42  0.44  0.01  0.63  0.03  0.01  0.44 
Short-term interest rates  0.67  0.20  0.01  0.58  0.26  0.07  0.86 
Long-term interest rates  0.18  0.27  0.01  0.53  0.34  0.09  0.87 
M1 0.37  0.01  0.01  0.70  0.01  0.01  0.65 
Stock prices  0.43  0.58  0.01  0.86  0.02  0.01  0.84 
Wages 0.80  0.49  0.02  0.74  0.02  0.02  0.83 
Exports total  0.64  0.08  0.01  0.61  0.22  0.04  0.81 
Imports total  0.55  0.41  0.01  0.69  0.12  0.04  0.84 
Terms of trade  0.45  0.18  0.01  0.58  0.16  0.01  0.54 
Real effective exchange  0.17  0.03  0.01  0.75  0.75  0.01  0.55 
Current account balance  0.28  0.01  0.01  0.63  0.02  0.01  0.53 
FDI out  0.15  0.49  0.01  0.78  0.27  0.01  0.55 
FDI in  0.16  0.14  0.01  0.73  0.21  0.01  0.65 
1/ Forecast horizon is 20 quarters and refers to the levels of the series. Confidence intervals are constructed using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrapping technique 
  
Table 3b. Forecast Error Variance of the Common Component of South Africa Variables Explained by the USA Supply and the 
Demand Shock, 1995-2003 1/ 
                       
  Confidence Intervals  Confidence Intervals 
 
Variance 




Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Demand 
Shocks  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
GDP  0.05  0.17 0.01  0.67  0.02 0.01  0.51 
Gross Fixed Investment  0.13  0.30  0.01  0.74  0.30  0.01  0.58 
Personal consumption expenditure  0.18  0.04 0.01  0.73  0.79 0.03  0.81 
Government consumption expenditure  0.09  0.34 0.01  0.87  0.60 0.01  0.62 
Consumer  confidence  0.50  0.36 0.01  0.68  0.02 0.01  0.71 
Business  confidence  0.58  0.57 0.01  0.69  0.04 0.01  0.71 
Consumer  prices  0.25  0.50 0.01  0.72  0.23 0.02  0.67 
Short-term interest rates  0.55  0.29  0.01  0.77  0.03  0.00  0.75 
Long-term  interest  rates  0.60  0.02 0.00  0.65  0.04 0.01  0.75 
M1  0.05  0.19 0.01  0.77  0.01 0.01  0.68 
Stock  prices  0.11  0.28 0.02  0.64  0.06 0.01  0.61 
Unit Labour Cost  0.14  0.48  0.02  0.64  0.03  0.01  0.45 
Exports  total  0.04  0.21 0.01  0.67  0.22 0.04  0.88 
Imports  total  0.19  0.02 0.01  0.66  0.29 0.01  0.60 
Terms of trade  0.30  0.33  0.01  0.84  0.02  0.01  0.63 
Real effective exchange   0.69  0.16  0.01  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.78 
Current account balance  0.50  0.08  0.01  0.76  0.03  0.01  0.78 
Economic  growth  0.42  0.33 0.01  0.62  0.03 0.01  0.51 





















































 Figure 2: Impulse-Response Functions – Sample 1985-2003 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Appendix A 
 
Economic conditions for identification 
 
Once the process followed by the common components is postulated, structural 
shocks have to be identified. The identification of structural shocks is achieved by 
focusing on the reduced form VAR residuals of (5). Following Eickmeier (2007), the 
identification scheme has three steps. First, as in Uhlig (2003), rather than identifying 
a shock as, say, a productivity shock, and calculate its contribution to the variance of 
the k-step ahead prediction error of, say, US GDP, a few major shocks driving GDP 
are identified.
1 This implies maximizing the explanation of the chosen variance of the 
k-step ahead forecast error of GDP with a reduced number of shocks.
2 To this end,  -
step ahead prediction errors   are decomposed into   mutually orthogonal 
innovations using the Cholesky decomposition. The lower triangular Cholesky matrix 
k
t u k
A is such that  t t Av u =  and  I v v E t t = ′) ( . Hence, 
 
cov( ) ( ) . tt t uA E v v A A A ′′ ′ ==                                                                                   (A.1) 
 
Next, impulse-response functions are calculated. Following the example in which the 
variable of interest is US GDP, the impulse-response function of   in period   to the 
identified shock is obtained as follows: 
it y k
 
A B c R
k
i ik =                                                                                                          (A.2) 
 
                                                 
1 Uhlig (2003) shows that two shocks are sufficient to explain 90 percent of the variance at all horizons 
of real US GNP. 
2 If, for example, two orthogonal shocks are identified, it is incorrect to identify the first shock as the 
one corresponding to the first eigenvalue and the second orthogonal shock as the one corresponding to 
the second eigenvalue (see Uhlig, 2003). The two orthogonal shocks identified together generate the 
total variation, the explanation of which is being maximized. However, there are multiple possible 
combinations of those orthogonal shocks all of which will still explain the total variation chosen: as an 
illustration, and measuring angles in degrees, the pairings of orthogonal shocks with rotation angles 
{0,90} or {10,100} or {80,170} would be equally acceptable. The grid of the angle of rotation can be 









′ ∑  
 
Second, suppose that an identified shock is linearly correlated to the fundamental 
forces  )' ..., , , ( rt t 2 t 1 t ω ω ω ω = behind US GDP, through the  r r×  matrix Q. Thus,  
 
t t Q v ω = .                                                                                                                  (A.3) 
 
The identification procedure involves maximizing the forecast error variance of the 
variable of interest. The intuition of the procedure is to select Q in such a way that 
the first shock explains as much as possible of the forecast error variance of the 
U.S. GDP  common component over a certain horizon k , and the second shock 
explains as much as possible of the remaining forecast error variance. Focusing on the 
first shock, the task is to explain as much as possible of its error variance 
 






= σ                                                                                      (A.4) 
 
where i is, in our example, US GDP, and   is the first column of Q. The column   
is selected in such a way that 
1 q 1 q
2
















where .  ij
k
0 j
ij ik R R ) j 1 k ( S ∑
=
′ − + =
 
 
 The maximization problem subject to the side constraint  1 q q 1 1 = ′ , can be written as 
the Lagrangean, 
 
) 1 q q ( q S q L 1 1 1 ik 1 − ′ − ′ = λ                                                                                        (A.5) 
 
where λ  is the Lagrangean multiplier. From (A.5),   is the first eigenvector of   
with eigenvalue 
1 q ik S
λ  and, therefore, the shock associated with   is the first principal 
component shock. Q is the matrix of eigenvectors of  , ( , , …,  ), where   
(  is the eigenvector corresponding to the   principal component shock. 
Along the lines of Uhlig (2003), Eickmeier (2007), and Altig and others (2002), it is 
posed:   to 
1 q
S 1 q 2 q r q l q
) r ..., , 1 l=
th l
0 k = 19 k = , i.e., five years, which covers short- as well as medium-run 
dynamics. 
 
Orthogonal shocks are finally identified by rotation. If two shocks are identified, 
following Canova and de Nicoló (2003), the orthogonal shocks vector 
)' , ( t 2 t 1 t ω ω ω =  is multiplied by a  2 2×  orthogonal rotation matrix   of the form:  P
 
cos( ) sin( )
,









where θ  is the rotation angle;  ) , 0 ( π θ∈  produces all possible rotations and varies on 
a grid. If θ  is fixed and  , there are  5 q= 2 / ) 1 q ( q −  bivariate rotations of different 
elements of the VAR. Following the insights of Sims (1992); and as in Peersman 
(2005), Canova and de Nicoló (2003), and Eickmeier (2007), the number of angles 
between 0 and π  is assumed to be 12: this implies 6,191,736,421x10
10 (12
10) 
rotations. Hence, the rotated factor  t t Pw w =  explains in total all the variation 
measured by the first two eigenvalues. This way, the two principal components ωi are 
associated with the two structural shocks wi through the matrix P, and the impulse-
response functions of the two structural shocks on all the fundamental forces can be 
estimated. 
 A sign-identification strategy is followed to identify the shocks. The method was 
developed by Peersman (2005). This strategy imposes inequality sign restrictions on 
the impulse-response functions of variables based on a typical aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply framework.
3 Only those rotations among all possible   rotations 
that have a structural meaning are chosen. The text table displays the sign restrictions 
for the identification of shocks that are imposed contemporaneously and during the 




Positive Positive Monetary Policy
Supply Shock Demand Shock Tightening
GDP ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
Prices ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0




The variance share of the common component of South African GDP growth is used 
to assess the degree of integration of South Africa in the global economy, and the 
variance shares of the common components of other variables are used to assess the 
relative strengths of the channels of transmission of shocks. Moreover, the variances 
shares of the common components are calculated on the rates of growth of the 
variables whereas the variances of forecast errors are calculated on the basis of the 
levels of the variables. The latter is used to evaluate the relative strengths of shocks 






                                                 
3 See Peersman (2005) for more technical details. 
4 Note that inequalities include zero responses, some of which are usually excluded in the VAR 
literature. As shown by Peersman (2005), the latter may sometimes be unduly restrictive. Peersman 
shows, for example, that oil prices do react within one quarter to demand and monetary policy shocks. 
In contrast, imposing the standard contemporaneous zero restriction on oil prices make them appear as 
exogenous rather than as endogenous responses of an asset price to demand disturbances and monetary 
policy shocks.  
 Appendix B 
Macroeconomic Series 
                 
          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
1  EMU  Production in total manufacturing sa  1  l  3 
2  EMU  Sales of total manufactured goods (Value) sa  1  l  3 
3  EMU  Permits issued for dwellings sa  1  l  3 
4  EMU  PPI Total Manufacturing - Domestic Market  1  l  3 
5  EMU  Monetary aggregate M1 sa  1  l  3 
6  EMU  Monetary aggregate M3 sa  1  l  3 
7  EMU  MFI Credit to the non-MFI sector sa  1  l  3 
8  EMU  ECU-EUR/USD exchange rate monthly average  1  l  3 
9  EMU  Gross domestic product,  Constant Prices  1  l  3 
10  EMU  Private final consumption expenditure,  Constant Prices  1  l  3 
11 EMU 
Government final consumption expenditure,  Constant 
Prices 1  l  3 
12  EMU  Gross fixed capital formation,  Constant Prices  1  l  3 
13  EMU  Exports of goods and services,  Constant Prices  1  l  3 
14  EMU  Imports of goods and services,  Constant Prices  1  l  3 
15  EMU  Gross domestic product,  Implicit price deflator  1  l  3 
16  EMU  Net exports of goods and services,  Constant Prices  1  nl  2 
17  EMU  Manufacturing - Orders inflow/Demand: tendency sa  0  nl  0 
18  EMU  Manufacturing - Rate of capacity utilization sa  0  l  1 
19  EMU  Changes in inventories,  Constant Prices  0  nl  0 
20  Japan                 Balance of income, value, balance of payments basis  1  nl  2 
21  Japan                 Current account, value  1  nl  2 
22  Japan                 Government consumption of fixed capital, value   1  l  3 
23  Japan                 Private final consumption expenditure, volume \  1  l  3 
24  Japan                 Dependent employment \ Persons  1  l  3 
25  Japan                 Dependent employment of the business sector \ Persons  1  l  3 
26  Japan                 Government employment \ Persons  1  l  3 
27  Japan                 Self-employed \ Persons  1  l  3 
28  Japan                 Total employment \ Persons  1  l  3 
29  Japan                 Employment of the business sector \ Persons  1  l  3 
30  Japan                 Exchange rate, index of US$ per local currency \ Index  1  l  3 
31  Japan                 Real Effective exchange rate, 2000 = 100, ULC-based  1  l  3 
32  Japan                 Gross domestic product, volume, market prices \   1  l  3 
33  Japan                 Private non-residential fixed capital formation, volume \  1  l  3 
34  Japan                 Fixed investment of government enterprises, volume \  1  l  3 
35  Japan                 Government fixed capital formation, volume \  1  l  3 
36  Japan                 Private residential fixed capital formation, volume   1  l  3 
37  Japan                 Industrial production \ Index  1  l  3 
38  Japan                 Private total fixed capital formation, volume \  1  l  3 
39  Japan                 Long-term interest rate on government bonds \   1  nl  2 
40  Japan                 Gross total fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
41  Japan                 Capital stock of the business sector, volume \  1  l  3 
42  Japan                 Capital stock, housing, volume \  1  l  3 
                 
          Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                   
43  Japan                 Labour force \ Persons  1  l  3 
44  Japan                 Labour force participation rate  1  nl  2 
45  Japan                
Imports of goods&services, volume, national accounts 
basis \   1  l  3 
46  Japan                 Money supply, broad definition: M2 or M3   1  l  3 
47  Japan                 Factor income paid abroad, volume,   1  l  3 
48  Japan                 Labour productivity of the total economy \ Index  1  l  3 
49  Japan                 Labour productivity of the business economy  1  l  3 
50  Japan                 Government saving(net), value  1  nl  2 
51  Japan                 Household saving, value \  1  l  3 
52  Japan                 Household saving ratio \   1  nl  2 
53  Japan                 Unit labour cost of the total economy \ Index  1  l  3 
54  Japan                 Unit labour cost of the manufacturing sector \ Index  1  l  3 
55  Japan                 Unemployment \ Persons  1  l  3 
56  Japan                 Unemployment rate \   1  nl  2 
57  Japan                 Velocity of money  1  l  3 
58  Japan                 Wages, value \  1  l  3 
59  Japan                 Wage rate of the business sector \ Index  1  l  3 
60  Japan                 Compensation rate of government employees  1  l  3 
61  Japan                
Wage rate of the manufacturing sector, hourly earnings \ 
Index 1  l  3 
62  Japan                 Compensation rate of the business sector \   1  l  3 
63  Japan                 Compensation of employees, value \   1  l  3 
64  Japan                
Exports of goods&services, volume, national accounts 
basis \   1  l  3 
65  Japan                 Factor income from abroad, volume,\   1  l  3 
66  Japan                 Household disposable income, real \   1  l  3 
67  Japan                 Property income received by households, value \   1  l  3 
68  Japan                 Government current disbursements, value \   1  l  3 
69  Japan                 Current disbursements of households, value \   1  l  3 
70  Japan                 Government current receipts, value \   1  l  3 
71  Japan                 Current receipts of households, value \  1  l  3 
72  Japan                 Self-employment income received by households, value   1  l  3 
73  Japan                 Direct Investment Abroad  1  nl  2 
74  Japan                 Portfolio Investment Assets  1  nl  2 
75  Japan                 Financial Account  1  nl  2 
76  Japan                 Exports Prices  1  l  3 
77  Japan                 Imports Prices  1  l  3 
78  Japan                 Terms of Trade  1  l  3 
79  Japan                 Call Money Rate  1  nl  2 
80  Japan                 Share Prices  1  l  3 
81  Japan                 PPI /  1  l  3 
82  Japan                 CPI  1  l  3 
83  Japan                 Other Investment Liab  1  nl  0 
84  Japan                 Increase in stocks, volume \   0  nl  0 






                           
          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
86  Japan                 Direct Investment in Republic  0  nl  0 
87  Japan                 Portfolio Investment Liab  0  nl  0 
88  South Africa  Industrial production: manufacturing sa  1  l  3 
89  South Africa  Production in total mining  1  l  3 
90  South Africa  Unit labour cost: manufacturing sa  1  l  3 
91  South Africa  Producer prices: manufacturing  1  l  3 
92  South Africa  Producer prices: mining  1  l  3 
93  South Africa  Producer prices: industry  1  l  3 
94  South Africa  Producer prices: Elec. gas & water  1  l  3 
95  South Africa  Consumer prices: All items  1  l  3 
96  South Africa  Consumer prices: Food  1  l  3 
97  South Africa  Consumer prices: Fuel and Electricity  1  l  3 
98  South Africa  Consumer prices: Total goods  1  l  3 
99  South Africa  Consumer prices: Services  1  l  3 
100  South Africa  Monetary aggregate (M1) sa  1  l  3 
101  South Africa  Monetary aggregate (M2)  1  l  3 
102  South Africa  Monetary aggregate (M2) sa  1  l  3 
103  South Africa  Monetary aggregate (M3) sa  1  l  3 
104  South Africa  Yield 10+-year government bonds  1  nl  2 
105  South Africa  ZAR/USD exchange rate end period  1  l  3 
106  South Africa  BOP Current account balance  1  nl  2 
107  South Africa  BOP Cap. and fin. balance incl. reserves  1  nl  2 
108  South Africa  Exports of goods and services, constant prices  1  l  3 
109  South Africa  Imports of goods and services, constant prices  1  l  3 
110  South Africa  Final consumption expenditure, constant prices  1  l  3 
111  South Africa  Gross domestic product, constant prices sa  1  l  3 
112  South Africa  Gross fixed capital formation, constant prices  1  l  3 
113  South Africa  Changes in inventories, constant prices  1  nl  2 
114  South Africa  Households' consumption expenditure, constant prices  1  l  3 
115  South Africa  Government consumption expenditure, constant prices  1  l  3 
116 South  Africa  Share  Prices  1  l  3 
117  South Africa  Manufacturing - Orders inflow/Demand: tendency  0  nl  0 
118  South Africa  Manufacturing - Business situation: present  0  nl  0 
119  South Africa  Manufacturing - Confidence indicator  0  l  1 
120 South  Africa  Discount  rate  0  nl  0 
121  South Africa  Rate 91-day treasury bills  0  nl  0 
122  South Africa  Real Effective Exchange Rate  0  l  1 
123  South Africa  BOP Reserve assets  0  nl  0 
124  South Africa  Terms of Trade  0  l  1 
125  South Africa  GDP Growth rate (Annual)  0  nl  0 
126  United Kingdom  Balance of income, value, balance of payments basis  1  nl  2 
127  United Kingdom  Current account, value  1  nl  2 
128  United Kingdom  Government consumption of fixed capital, value \   1  l  3 
129  United Kingdom  Unit capital-labour costs  1  l  3 
130  United Kingdom  Private final consumption expenditure, volume \   1  l  3 
131  United Kingdom  Dependent employment \ Persons  1  l  3 




     
          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
132  United Kingdom  Dependent employment of the business sector \ Persons  1  l  3 
133  United Kingdom  Government employment \ Persons  1  l  3 
134  United Kingdom  Self-employed \ Persons  1  l  3 
135  United Kingdom  Total employment \ Persons  1  l  3 
136  United Kingdom  Employment of the business sector \ Persons  1  l  3 
137  United Kingdom  Exchange rate, index of US$ per local currency \ Index  1  l  3 
138  United Kingdom  Gross domestic product, volume, market prices \   1  l  3 
139  United Kingdom  Private non-residential fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
140  United Kingdom  Fixed investment in construction, volume \  1  l  3 
141  United Kingdom  Government fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
142  United Kingdom  Private residential fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
143  United Kingdom  Fixed investment in machinery & equipment, volume \  1  l  3 
144  United Kingdom  Private total fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
145  United Kingdom  Long-term interest rate on government bonds \  1  nl  2 
146  United Kingdom  Increase in stocks, volume \  1  nl  2 
147  United Kingdom  Gross total fixed capital formation, volume   1  l  3 
148  United Kingdom  Capital stock of the business sector, volume \   1  l  3 
149  United Kingdom  Labour force \ Persons  1  l  3 
150  United Kingdom  Labour force participation rate  1  nl  2 
151 United  Kingdom 
Imports of goods&services, volume, national accounts 
basis   1  l  3 
152  United Kingdom  Factor income paid abroad, volume,    1  l  3 
153  United Kingdom  Labour productivity of the total economy \ Index 2000  1  l  3 
154  United Kingdom  Labour productivity of the business economy  1  l  3 
155  United Kingdom  Household saving, value \  1  l  3 
156  United Kingdom  Household saving ratio \   1  nl  2 
157 United  Kingdom  Current  transfers received by households, value \   1  l  3 
158  United Kingdom  Unit labour cost of the total economy \ Index 2000  1  l  3 
159  United Kingdom  Unit labour cost of the manufacturing sector \Index 2001  1  l  3 
160  United Kingdom  Unemployment \ Persons  1  l  3 
161  United Kingdom  Wages, value \  1  l  3 
162  United Kingdom  Wage rate of the business sector \   1  l  3 
163  United Kingdom  Compensation rate of government employees \   1  l  3 
164 United  Kingdom 
Wage rate of the manufacturing sector, hourly earnings 
\Index 2001  1  l  3 
165  United Kingdom  Compensation rate of the business sector \   1  l  3 
166  United Kingdom  Compensation of employees, value \   1  l  3 
167 United  Kingdom 
Exports of goods&services, volume, national accounts 
basis \   1 l  3 
168  United Kingdom  Factor income from abroad  1  l  3 
169  United Kingdom  Household disposable income, real \   1  l  3 
170 United  Kingdom  Property income received by households, value 1  l  3 
171  United Kingdom  Government current disbursements, value \   1  l  3 
172  United Kingdom  Current disbursements of households, value \   1  l  3 
173  United Kingdom  Government current receipts, value \  1  l  3 
174 United  Kingdom  Current  receipts  of households, value \   1  l  3 




        
          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
175 United  Kingdom  Self-employment income received by households, value   1  l  3 
176  United Kingdom  Exports Prices  1  l  3 
177  United Kingdom  Imports Prices  1  l  3 
178  United Kingdom  Terms of Trade  1  l  3 
179  United Kingdom  Overnight Interbank Min  1  nl  2 
180  United Kingdom  PPI   1  l  3 
181  United Kingdom  CPI: All Items  1  l  3 
182 United  Kingdom  FTSE  100  1  l  3 
183 United  Kingdom 
\Cyclical Indicators\Surveys of Manufacturing 
Industry:\Current Industry:\Current Level of Capacity 
Utilization 1  l  3 
184  United Kingdom  Government saving(net), value \ GBP  1  nl  0 
185  United Kingdom  Unemployment rate \ PERCENT  1  nl  0 
186  United Kingdom      Real Effective exchange rate, 2000 = 100, ULC-based  1  l  3 
187  United Kingdom      Other Investment Assets  1  nl  2 
188  United Kingdom      Other Investment Liab  1  nl  2 
189  United Kingdom     
Cyclical Indicators\Consumer Opinion on Economic and 
Financial Conditions:\Composite Consumers Confidence 
Indicator  1 nl  0 
190  United Kingdom     
Cyclical Indicators\Surveys of Manufacturing 
Industry:\Composite Industrial Confidence Indicator  0 nl  0 
191  United Kingdom      Direct Investment Abroad  0  nl  0 
192  United Kingdom      Direct Investment in Republic  0  nl  0 
193  United Kingdom      Portfolio Investment Assets  0  nl  0 
194  United Kingdom      Portfolio Investment Liab  0  nl  0 
195  United Kingdom      Financial Account  0  nl  0 
196  United States  Balance of income, value, balance of payments basis   1  nl  2 
197  United States  Current account, value   1  nl  2 
198  United States  Government consumption of fixed capital, value \  1  l  3 
199  United States  Private final consumption expenditure, volume \   1  l  3 
200  United States  Employment, country specific, variable a \   1  l  3 
201  United States  Dependent employment \  1  l  3 
202  United States  Dependent employment of the business sector \  1  l  3 
203  United States  Government employment \   1  l  3 
204 United  States  Self-employed  \  1  l  3 
205  United States  Total employment \   1  l  3 
206  United States  Employment of the business sector \   1  l  3 
207  United States  Real Effective exchange rate  1  l  3 
208  United States  Gross domestic product, volume, market prices \   1  l  3 
209  United States  Private non-residential fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
210  United States  Government fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
211  United States  Industrial production \   1  l  3 
212  United States  Private total fixed capital formation, volume \  1  l  3 
213  United States  Long-term interest rate on government bonds \   1  nl  2 
214  United States  Long-term interest rate on corporate bonds \   1  nl  2 




                           
          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
216  United States  Gross total fixed capital formation, volume \   1  l  3 
217  United States  Capital stock of the business sector, volume \   1  l  3 
218  United States  Capital stock, housing, volume \   1  l  3 
219  United States  Labour force \   1  l  3 
220  United States  Labour force participation rate \   1  nl  2 
221 United  States 
Imports of goods&services, volume, national accounts 
basis \  1  l  3 
222 United  States 
Money supply, narrow definition: base money, M1 or M2 
\  1 l  3 
223  United States  Money supply, broad definition: M2 or M3 \   1  l  3 
224  United States  Factor income paid abroad, volume,    1  l  3 
225  United States  Labour productivity of the total economy \   1  l  3 
226  United States  Labour productivity of the business economy \   1  l  3 
227  United States  Household saving ratio \   1  nl  2 
228  United States  Current transfers received by households, value \   1  l  3 
229  United States  Unit labour cost of the total economy \   1  l  3 
230  United States  Unit labour costs in the business sector \   1  l  3 
231  United States  Unit labour cost of the manufacturing sector \   1  l  3 
232  United States  Velocity of money \   1  l  3 
233  United States  Wages, value \  1  l  3 
234  United States  Wages of the government sector, value \   1  l  3 
235  United States  Wage rate of the business sector \   1  l  3 
236  United States  Compensation rate of government employees \   1  l  3 
237  United States  Wage rate of the manufacturing sector, hourly earnings \  1  l  3 
238  United States  Compensation rate of the business sector \   1  l  3 
239  United States  Compensation of employees, value \   1  l  3 
240  United States  Exports of goods & services, volume,   1  l  3 
241  United States  Factor income from abroad, volume,   1  l  3 
242  United States  Household disposable income, real \   1  l  3 
243  United States  Property income received by households, value \   1  l  3 
244  United States  Government current disbursements, value \  1  l  3 
245  United States  Current disbursements of households, value \   1  l  3 
246  United States  Government current receipts, value \   1  l  3 
247 United  States  Current  receipts  of households, value \   1  l  3 
248  United States  Self-employment income received by households\   1  l  3 
249  United States  Direct Investment Abroad  1  nl  2 
250  United States  Direct Investment in Republic  1  nl  2 
251  United States  Portfolio Investment Assets  1  nl  2 
252  United States  Portfolio Investment Liab  1  nl  2 
253 United  States  Financial  Account  1  nl  2 
254  United States  Exports Prices  1  l  3 
255  United States  Imports Prices  1  l  3 
256  United States  Terms of Trade  1  l  3 
257  United States  PPI /   1  l  3 
258 United  States  CPI  1  l  3 
259  United States  Share Prices  1  l  3 





          
Number  Country  Variable Name  Unit Root  Log  Treatment 
          
                 
260  United States  Consumer Confidence  0  nl  0 
261  United States  USA PMI Business confidence  0  nl  0 
262  United States  Fixed investment in non-residential construction \   0  l  1 
263  United States  Private residential fixed capital formation, volume \   0  l  1 
264  United States  Fixed investment in machinery & equipment, volume \   0  l  1 
265  United States  Increase in stocks, volume \   0  nl  0 
266  United States  Government saving(net), value \  0  nl  0 
267  United States  Household saving, value \   0  l  1 
268  United States  Unemployment \   0  l  1 
269  United States  Unemployment rate \   0  nl  0 
270  United States  Production/Rate of capacity utilisat  0  nl  0 
271  United States  Other Investment Assets  0  nl  0 
272  United States  Other Investment Liab  0  nl  0 
273  World                 Commodity Food and Beverage Price Index  1  l  3 
274  World                
Crude Oil (petroleum), simple average of three spot 
prices; Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the 
Dubai Fateh, US$ per barrel  1  l  3   
275  World                
Commodity Metals Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes 
Copper, Aluminum, Iron Ore, Tin, Nickel, Zinc, Lead, 
and Uranium Price Indices  1  l  3 
276  World                
Commodity Non-Fuel Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes 
Food and Beverages and Industrial Inputs Price Indices  1 l  3 
277  World                
Commodity Industrial Inputs Price Index, 1995 = 100, 
includes Agricultural Raw Materials and Metals Price 
Indices 0  l  1 
                 
          
Note: Interger of order 0 = 0, 1 = 1, 2 = 2; natural log variables = l, no transformation =nl  
Treatment 0 = no transformattion; 1 = logarithm; 2 = first difference; 3 = first difference of logarithm  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 